You wouldn't teach Golden State's rebuilding process in a GM seminar, but there are lessons to be learned from the Warriors' rise.
Thanks to Sam Hinkie and the fantastically dreadful Philadelphia 76ers, rebuilding theories are a major topic of NBA analysis and discourse, which hasn't always been the case. Terrible teams are usually relegated to a low hush with outbursts of snark, not serious consideration and debate. Of course, the discourse around the Sixers is such that one might prefer that low hush, rather than the shrill cries that accompany their efforts. Alas, you go to war with the talking points you have, not the ones you wish existed.
With all the emphasis on rebuilding, it's useful to look at how the very best team in the NBA, the Golden State Warriors, built their roster. And once you look below the surface, you find that the Warriors have executed one of the least prudent and most successful rebuilds in memory.
In 2008, the Warriors went 48-34 but missed the playoffs in an impossible West. That summer, Baron Davis bailed to join his hometown Clippers. The Warriors, still under the control of Chris Cohan and run by Chris Mullin, had a disastrous little backup plan: the team committed $179 million to Monta Ellis, Andris Biedrins and Corey Maggette. Before the season began, Ellis wrecked his ankle in a moped accident. He gave back some money and only played 25 games. A couple weeks into the season, the team bowed to Stephen Jackson and gave him a three-year extension. The Warriors went 29-53.
Mullin was canned at the end of the season (Larry Riley took over), but the team still completed Step 1 of its rebuild by drafting Stephen Curry seventh overall in the 2009 NBA Draft. A forgettable 2010 season led to the team finding buyers for Maggette and Jackson, and the No. 6 pick, which was blown on Ekpe Udoh. Then Joe Lacob and pals bought the team.
When the new regime in Golden State arrived, it had Curry, Udoh, Ellis and not much else. The crew's first big splash was to sign-and-trade for David Lee at a massive price. Everyone knew the Warriors overpaid, but the team was betting that it wouldn't matter, that getting good players would trump whatever loss of flexibility came with it. (That line of thinking would repeat itself later on.) The Warriors also replaced Don Nelson with his protegé Keith Smart and finished 36-46.
Lacob fired Smart at the end of the season and rolled the dice with Mark Jackson. The Warriors made their second brilliant draft pick (the first of the Lacob era) with Klay Thompson. He, of course, played the same position as Ellis, who'd been putting up solid numbers when healthy.
At midseason of the lockout-shortened year, the Warriors shipped Ellis and Udoh to Milwaukee for Andrew Bogut, who was injured, owed a bunch of money and wouldn't play at all for Golden State that 2011-12 season. The deal was reviled by a certain sect of Warriors fans and it had some tanking connotations. The Warriors would only keep their pick if it was among the top seven.
Jackson began resting even young players down the stretch, apparently to score some losses. It worked, and the Warriors took Harrison Barnes with the seventh pick and Draymond Green in the second round. Curry had also dealt with recurring ankle problems, which Golden State used their advantage in negotiating an early Bird extension that is now one of the best bargains in the NBA.
The rest is history: the Warriors had a huge turnaround in 2012-13, then signed Andre Iguodala to a hefty deal to augment the attack. Golden State overpaid for Iguodala given his age and lack of offensive production, but he fit and they had the space, so they didn't mind. Three months after paying Iguodala, the Warriors handed Bogut a lucrative extension. Lacob and crew felt great about the team's direction, and wasn't afraid to keep the band together.
That impatience struck again, though, even after Jackson led the Warriors to their first 50-win season in 20 years. Last offseason, the team dumped Jackson, hired Steve Kerr and handed Thompson a max extension worth about $70 million over four years. These were another two dice rolls that have paid off handsomely: Kerr is a top candidate for Coach of the Year and Thompson is a first-time All-Star.
Over the past five years, the Warriors have overpaid fringe stars, drafted exceptionally well while never picking higher than No. 6, taken huge gambles in trades, free agency and on the sidelines and have generally been impatient with the status quo. And that's gotten them to 57 wins and counting.
You wouldn't use the Warriors' path as a classic case study in NBA Rebuilding 101, because they violated a few of the so-called rules of team creation. They overpaid in a cap-limited salary system. They made hair-trigger decisions in a league where patience is rewarded.
But perhaps that's a problem with so many rebuilds that go awry: the ones that go strictly by the book rarely work. Building an NBA team is more art than science. That may yet be something the analytic-minded Hinkie learns the hard way.
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